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Preventing Divisiveness: The Ninth Circuit Upholds the
1954 Pledge Amendment in Newdow v. Rio Linda Union
School District
I. INTRODUCTION
In October of 2010, a Mississippi state court judge requested that all
in his courtroom recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Each person did so—
except an attorney who stood but refused to recite it.1 In response, the
judge held the attorney in contempt of the court and jailed him for five
hours.2 The judge’s order was uncompromising: “[the attorney] shall
purge himself of said criminal contempt by complying with the order of
this Court by standing and reciting the Pledge of Allegiance in open
court.”3 Though this is clearly a case of judicial misconduct, this story
also demonstrates, more importantly, the magnitude of disagreement that
arises from the recitation of the Pledge. The patriotic, religious, and
political dimensions heighten its controversy, especially when
government actors lead its recitation—whether they be judges, public
school employees, or other officials.
Such was the case in Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District.4
The plaintiff, Michael Newdow, challenged the recitation of the Pledge
in his daughter’s public school classroom because of the words “under
God.”5 Newdow’s Pledge challenge was just one of his several
constitutional challenges to the government’s use of the word “God” in
the public sphere.6 These challenges have included requests for
injunctive relief enjoining Chief Justice John Roberts’s use of the words
“So help me God” after administering the presidential oath during
inaugurations,7 the use of opening prayers in legislative sessions,8 the

1. Holbrook Mohr, Mississippi Judge Jails Attorney for Not Reciting Pledge, SAN ANGELO
STANDARD-TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, http://www.gosanangelo.com/news/2010/ oct/07/bc-us--jailedover-pledge1st-ld-writethru0317.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 597 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2010).
5. Id. at 1012.
6. See Current Litigation Page, RESTORE OUR PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE,
http://www.restorethepledge.com/ (last updated June 23, 2011), for the status of Dr. Newdow’s
ongoing litigation.
7. Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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use of the phrase “In God We Trust” on currency,9 and President Bush’s
invitation to a clergyman to give a prayer at his presidential
inauguration.10 Though the subject matter of these challenges has been
varied, Newdow’s claim was the same in each case: the challenged
government action violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. In Rio Linda, the Ninth Circuit ruled against Newdow,
upholding the constitutionality of the “under God” language in the
Pledge.11 It also upheld the constitutionality of a California statute that
requires school teachers to lead students in a daily patriotic exercise—a
requirement that the statute suggests is fulfilled by the recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance.12
Although the Ninth Circuit correctly upheld the constitutionality of
the state Pledge statute, it overreached by ruling on the constitutionality
of the 1954 Pledge amendment, which added the words “under God.” To
justify its holding under the Supreme Court’s current tests, the Ninth
Circuit improperly relied upon the doctrine of ceremonial deism, which
is an unsuitable rationale for arguing the constitutionality of
governmental references to deity. As an alternative to the Supreme
Court’s current tests in this area, this Note will argue that judicial review
of longstanding government references to deity should be analyzed with
a legal standard advocated by Justice Breyer, which takes into account
the divisiveness along religious lines caused by the government’s
“purg[ing] from the public sphere all that in any way partakes of the
religious.”13 Although Justice Breyer advanced this rationale in the
context of government monuments that contain references to deity, this
Note will argue for its application to all longstanding government
references to deity. This standard would help avoid “creat[ing] the very

8. Newdow v. Eagen, 309 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 2004).
9. Newdow v. Lefevere, 598 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2010).
10. Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D.D.C. 2005).
11. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010).
12. Id. The statute reads:
In every public elementary school each day during the school year at the beginning of the
first regularly scheduled class or activity period at which the majority of the pupils of the
school normally begin the schoolday, there shall be conducted appropriate patriotic
exercises. The giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of
America shall satisfy the requirements of this section.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52720 (West 2009).
13. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment)
(citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
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kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause
seeks to avoid.”14
This divisiveness rationale provides a pragmatic compromise to a
difficult issue: a monument on government property that includes a
reference to deity, if it has survived unchallenged for at least forty years,
is constitutional if tearing it down would create the divisiveness that the
Establishment Clause seeks to prevent. The same would be true for the
Pledge and other governmental references to deity: if the tradition has
survived Establishment Clause review for forty years, it is constitutional
if its compelled discontinuance would create the divisiveness that the
Establishment Clause seeks to prevent. New governmental religious
references, fewer than forty years old, would be analyzed under the
Supreme Court’s current Establishment Clause tests.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II gives further insight into
Newdow’s Establishment Clause challenge to the 1954 amendment to
the Pledge. Part III provides context and background regarding the
Pledge of Allegiance, including relevant Supreme Court cases. Part IV
explains the Ninth Circuit’s Rio Linda decision. Part V analyzes Rio
Linda and argues for the application of a divisiveness standard to all
longstanding governmental references to deity.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Elk Grove: Newdow’s First Constitutional Challenge to the Pledge
Rio Linda was not Newdow’s first challenge to the Pledge. His first
challenge to California’s Pledge statute came in Elk Grove Unified
School District v. Newdow. There, the Ninth Circuit held that
California’s Pledge statute was unconstitutional.15 However, the
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that Newdow did not
have prudential standing because his ability to bring claims on behalf of
his daughter was questionable.16 By so holding, the Supreme Court
avoided ruling on the constitutionality of the Pledge.17

14. Id. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639, 717–29 (2002)).
15. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 490 (9th Cir. 2003) (amending the panel’s
opinion, which, in fact, made a determination as to the constitutionality of Congress’s 1954
amendment to the Pledge, which added the words “under God”), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
16. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 17–18.
17. Id. at 18.
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B. Rio Linda: Newdow’s Second Constitutional Challenge to the Pledge
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Elk Grove, Newdow
again brought his claim in a federal district court to challenge the
constitutionality of the 1954 amendment to the Pledge and the California
Pledge statute, but this time he was joined by two other sets of plaintiffparents whose custody rights did not raise standing concerns.18 Other
than the newly added plaintiffs, Newdow’s renewed constitutional claim
in Rio Linda was “almost identical”19 to the case that the Supreme Court
had recently dismissed in Elk Grove. As was expected in Rio Linda, the
district court held that Newdow still lacked standing, noting that
Newdow’s custody arrangement had not changed since the Supreme
Court decided Elk Grove.20 However, the district court determined that
the other plaintiff-parents had standing to challenge the state statute on
behalf of their children.21
Ultimately, the district court concluded that it was bound by the
Ninth Circuit’s prior determination that the school district’s Pledge
recitation policy was unconstitutional.22 The district court reasoned that
because the Supreme Court had only reversed the Ninth Circuit in Elk
Grove for prudential standing reasons, the Ninth Circuit’s prior
determination on the merits of the case was still binding.23 It therefore
held that the school district’s Pledge policy violated the First
Amendment.24 The Rio Linda appeal followed.
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part will first provide a brief history of the Pledge, including
two important Supreme Court cases stemming from its recitation. Next, it
will address the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause tests, which the
Court uses to determine whether a government action violates the
Establishment Clause. This analysis will not attempt a comprehensive
treatment of those Establishment Clause tests, but it will provide a
foundation that is necessary for an understanding of Rio Linda. Last, this

18. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 383 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (E.D. Cal. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Newdow
v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2010).
19. Id. at 1233.
20. Id. at 1239.
21. Id. at 1240.
22. Id. at 1241.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1242.
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Part will summarize three of the Supreme Court’s key decisions that
guided the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Rio Linda.
A. The Pledge and the Supreme Court
1. The Pledge’s authorship and codification
The original Pledge, authored by Francis Bellamy in 1892, reads: “I
pledge allegiance to my Flag and to the Republic for which it stands—
one Nation indivisible—with Liberty and Justice for all.”25 It was later
codified by the U.S. Congress during World War II and slightly modified
to “I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to
the Republic for which it stands, one Nation indivisible, with liberty and
justice for all.”26 In 1954, Congress amended the Pledge to add the
words “under God,”27 and this is the version that exists today: “I pledge
allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the
Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with
liberty and justice for all.”28
2. Early Supreme Court cases dealing with the Pledge
The first court challenge to a public school’s Pledge recitation policy
occurred before Congress’s 1954 “under God” amendment. In
Minersville School District v. Gobitis,29 two Jehovah’s Witness school
children were expelled for refusing to recite the Pledge in public
school.30 To the students, pledging allegiance to the flag would be a
violation of scripture, namely:
Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not
make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any
thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth
beneath, or that is in the water under the earth. Thou
shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them.31

25. RICHARD J. ELLIS, TO THE FLAG: THE UNLIKELY HISTORY OF THE PLEDGE OF
ALLEGIANCE 19 (2005).
26. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis
added).
27. Id. at 1032.
28. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
29. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
30. Id. at 591.
31. Id. at 592 n.1 (quoting Exodus 20:3–5 (King James)).
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The father of the students sued to enjoin the school from forcing the
students to recite the Pledge.32 The Supreme Court denied relief to the
children, reversing the trial court and court of appeals.33 In doing so, the
Court framed its decision in terms of judicial modesty, reasoning that
granting relief “would in effect make [the Court] the school board for the
country.”34 Allowing broad discretion in such patriotic exercises, the
Court noted: “A society which is dedicated to the preservation of these
ultimate values of civilization may in self-protection utilize the
educational process for inculcating those almost unconscious feelings
which bind men together in a comprehending loyalty, whatever may be
their lesser differences and difficulties.”35 Therefore, under Gobitis,
school officials could permissibly force students to recite the Pledge.
However, in a nearly identical case just a few years later, the
Supreme Court reversed itself in West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette.36 Here, the Court framed much of its rationale around the
freedom of thought and its accompanying protection of disagreement.
The Court stated: “[T]he compulsory flag salute and pledge requires
affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.”37 It reasoned, “Those
who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves
exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves
only the unanimity of the graveyard.”38 These evils, according to the
Court, were what the First Amendment was designed to prevent.39 “If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.”40 Thus, Barnette firmly
established a right not to say the Pledge.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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Id. at 600.
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Id. at 633.
Id. at 641.
Id.
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B. The Establishment Clause and the Supreme Court’s Tests

The First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . .”41 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Establishment
Clause seeks to protect the “right to select any religious faith or none at
all.”42 The Supreme Court has noted that although the Amendment may
have initially been interpreted as protecting diversity among Christian
faiths, “today [it is] recognized as guaranteeing religious liberty and
equality to ‘the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian
faith such as Islam or Judaism.’”43 To serve these aims, the Supreme
Court has created three separate tests or frames of analysis to assess
whether a government action violates the Establishment Clause.
First, the Lemon test, created by the Supreme Court to “refine” or
combine Establishment Clause principles found in its earlier precedents,
focuses on three criteria.44 To survive an Establishment Clause claim
under the Lemon test, the statute, first, “must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an
excessive government entanglement with religion.’”45
Second, the Supreme Court may analyze a governmental action
under the endorsement test. Here, the Court invalidates a governmental
practice if it “either has the purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion.”46
Additionally, the governmental action is held unconstitutional if its
purpose or effect favors or promotes religion, “particularly if it has the
effect of endorsing one religion over another.”47 The doctrine also
forbids “government from conveying or attempting to convey a message
that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”48
Third, the Supreme Court may also use the coercion test to determine
the constitutionality of government actions, especially those affecting

41. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985).
43. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. at
52).
44. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
45. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (citations omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S.
664, 674 (1970)).
46. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592.
47. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578–79).
48. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70).
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students in secondary and elementary schools. In Lee v. Weisman, the
Supreme Court reasoned that “the government may no more use social
pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means.”49
Therefore, the Court reasoned that a public school may not put its
students in the position of either participating in a religious exercise or
protesting it.50 The Lee Court based this reasoning on its observation that
“adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards
conformity, and that the influence is strongest in matters of social
convention.”51 Therefore, the Supreme Court will not uphold any school
actions that “compel a student to participate in a religious exercise.”52
C. The Establishment Clause and Public Education
The Supreme Court has consistently invalidated governmentsponsored religious exercises in public schools. A brief analysis of the
three following cases will demonstrate this scrutiny and will provide
context for the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Rio Linda. In the earliest
Establishment Clause challenge to a school policy, Engel v. Vitale, the
Supreme Court struck down a school district’s policy mandating daily
prayer in classes.53 Since that decision, the Court has subsequently
applied increasing scrutiny to any religious exercises in public schools
that could be perceived as being sponsored by the government.
1. Prayer endorsement: Wallace v. Jaffree
Twenty years after it decided Engel, the Supreme Court struck down
an Alabama statute that required school teachers to announce a daily
one-minute moment of silence, which could be used, according to the
statute, “for meditation or voluntary prayer.”54 Applying the first
element of the Lemon test, the Court noted that it was “appropriate to ask
‘whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of
religion.’”55 Using this analysis, the Court concluded that the statute was
“not motivated by any clearly secular purpose—indeed, the statute had

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
(1985)).
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505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992).
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id. at 599.
370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985).
Id. at 56 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690
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no secular purpose.”56 Noting that the statute said “or voluntary prayer,”
the Court held that the statute violated the endorsement test because
those words showed that “the State intended to characterize prayer as a
favored practice.”57
2. Prayers at graduation exercises: Lee v. Weisman
The Supreme Court also invalidated a Rhode Island school practice
in which principals invited religious leaders from various local
denominations to give an invocation and benediction at graduations for
middle schools and high schools.58 The Court noted that it had
“heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle
coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.”59
Further, the “preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and
worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the private
sphere.”60 Accordingly, the Court held that the school’s practice of
allowing prayers at graduation ceremonies unconstitutionally persuaded
or compelled students to “participate in a religious exercise.”61
3. Prayer at football games: Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe
Most recently, the Supreme Court struck down a Santa Fe School
District policy that allowed students to vote on whether to have an
invocation at their football and baseball games, and to vote on which
student should give those invocations for the entire school year.62 The
Court concluded that this election system placed students with minority
views “at the mercy of the majority.”63 This program impermissibly
sponsored a religious message, the Court reasoned, “because it sends the
ancillary message to members of the audience who are nonadherents
‘that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and
an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.’”64 Accordingly, the Court
56. Id.
57. Id. at 60.
58. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
59. Id. at 592.
60. Id. at 589.
61. Id. at 599.
62. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 297 (2000).
63. Id. at 304.
64. Id. at 309–10 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1985) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
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concluded that the prayers at football games had the “improper effect of
coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship.”65
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
In Rio Linda, the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the
California Pledge statute. The court further held that the 1954
amendment to the Pledge was constitutional.66
A. The Court’s Analysis of the Pledge’s History and Purpose
The Rio Linda majority concluded that the Pledge’s purpose was to
create national unity through an expression of historical ideals.67 The
Pledge, according to the majority, is not an expression of religious belief,
but rather an expression of the Founding Fathers’ beliefs.68 The words,
“One Nation under God,” according to the majority, are a mere
“reference to the historical and political underpinnings of our nation.”69
Therefore, the Pledge is “one of allegiance to our Republic, not of
allegiance to the God or to any religion.”70 The majority bolstered this
conclusion by quoting the Supreme Court’s assessment in Elk Grove that
the Pledge is a “patriotic exercise designed to foster national unity and
pride.”71
Notwithstanding this characterization, the court acknowledged the
“religious connotations” of the Pledge.72 Nevertheless, the majority
concluded: “Not every mention of God or religion by our government or
at the government’s direction is a violation of the Establishment
Clause.”73 The majority cited six cases in which a government’s
reference to religion or God was upheld by the Supreme Court,
emphasizing that when those religious references were considered “in
context, none of the government actions violated the Establishment
Clause.”74 The majority’s emphasis on context persists throughout its

65. Id. at 312.
66. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1036 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 1014.
71. Id. (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 6 (2004)).
72. Id. at 1036.
73. Id. at 1013.
74. Id. at 1013 (citing Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005); Cnty. of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 670–71 (1984); Marsh v.
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opinion in an attempt to diminish the religious weight of the words
“under God.”
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Application of the Establishment Clause Tests
The majority opinion analyzed the Pledge under all three of the
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause tests. The court’s analysis under
each test will be addressed in turn.
1. The Lemon test
The majority used a sort of two-tiered Lemon approach,75 finding
that both the California Pledge statute and the federal Pledge itself
passed the Lemon test.76 California’s Pledge statute reads,
In every public elementary school each day during the school year at
the beginning of the first regularly scheduled class or activity period at
which the majority of the pupils of the school normally begin the
schoolday, there shall be conducted appropriate patriotic exercises. The
giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of
America shall satisfy the requirements of this section. 77

In its review of the Pledge statute, the majority noted that the parties had
agreed that the statute satisfied the requirements of Lemon’s first and
third elements: it had a secular purpose and did not promote government
entanglement with religion.78 Next, the majority reasoned that the Pledge
was merely one way that teachers could fulfill the requirements of the
statute, since it only requires some sort of a daily patriotic exercise.79
Because the Pledge constitutes just one activity that would meet the
requirements of the statute, and because the statute does not mention
anything religious, the majority concluded that the statute passed the
second prong of the Lemon test.80
After it concluded that California’s Pledge statute was constitutional,
the majority next held that the 1954 amendment to the Pledge was also

Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784–86 (1983); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970); Everson
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8–11 (1947)).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 44–45.
76. Rio Linda, 597 F.3d at 1017.
77. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52720 (West 2009).
78. Rio Linda, 597 F.3d at 1018.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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constitutional under the Lemon test.81 The majority’s analysis began with
the “least controversial”82 second and third prongs of the Lemon test. It
concluded that the Pledge did not violate the third element of the Lemon
test because the Pledge did not cause excessive entanglement between
government and religion.83 Likewise, the majority held that the Pledge
did not violate the second prong of the Lemon test because the Pledge
had the “effect of promoting an appreciation of the values and ideals that
define our nation,” namely “patriotism, pride, and love of country, not of
divine fulfillment or spiritual enlightenment.”84
After its brief treatment of the latter two prongs, the majority
addressed the purpose prong of the Lemon test, to which it devoted the
bulk of its opinion. Here, the majority emphasized the patriotic context
of the words “under God.”85 The court supported this reasoning by
noting that the California statute suggests a recitation of the entire
Pledge.86 Having thus defined the Pledge as a patriotic exercise, the
majority used this characterization to distinguish several Supreme Court
cases holding that religious exercises constituted violations of the
Establishment Clause.87 Those cases, the majority noted, had “a
fundamental characteristic absent from the recitation of the Pledge: the
exercise, observance, classroom lecture, or activity was predominantly
religious in nature—a prayer, invocation, petition, or a lecture about
‘creation science.’”88
The majority further reasoned that the legislative history showed that
Congress had a secular purpose when it enacted the Pledge.89 The
majority filled nearly four consecutive pages of its sixty-page opinion
with a direct quotation from the Pledge’s legislative history.90 In
addition, the majority reasoned that history itself supports Congress’s
view of the Pledge, highlighting the role that God played in the lives of

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1018–19.
85. Id. at 1019.
86. Id. at 1020.
87. Id. (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1023.
90. Id. at 1025–28.
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the framers of the Constitution.91 Having considered the legislative
history and the patriotic purpose of the Pledge, the majority concluded
that the school district’s recitation of the Pledge did not violate the
Establishment Clause.92
2. The endorsement test
Likewise, the majority concluded that the Pledge was constitutional
under the endorsement test93 because its purpose and effect were “that of
a predominantly patriotic, not a religious, exercise.”94 As before, the
majority emphasized the patriotic context of the words “under God,”
rejecting the dissent’s concentration on the two words alone.95
Therefore, the majority concluded, the Pledge endorses “our form of
government, not of religion or any particular sect.”96
3. The coercion test
The majority conceded that the district policy coerced97 students into
listening to the daily Pledge recitation.98 The majority further conceded
that the Pledge recitation may have induced students to say the Pledge.99
However, the majority reasoned that despite these concerns, the Pledge
did not raise the Establishment Clause issues presented in Lee v.
Weisman, wherein the Supreme Court found a violation because students
were coerced into listening to a prayer at their graduation.100 The
majority noted that the Pledge does not coerce students to affirm a belief
in God.101 It further reasoned that because the Pledge is not a prayer, the
coercion to participate in that patriotic exercise did not raise
Establishment Clause concerns.102 The majority explained that Lee’s
analysis was limited to religious exercises, which is why Lee’s result did

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 1028–31.
Id. at 1037.
See supra text accompanying notes 46–48.
Rio Linda, 597 F.3d at 1037.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 49–52.
Rio Linda, 597 F.3d at 1038.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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not apply.103 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Pledge statute
did not violate the coercion test.104
Having concluded that the Pledge statute survived analysis under the
Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test, the Court held
that the California Pledge statute was constitutional as it did not violate
the Establishment Clause.105 It likewise held that the federal Pledge itself
was constitutional.106
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Overreached by Declaring that the Pledge was
Constitutional
The majority came to the correct result in Rio Linda, but in doing so,
it overreached by ruling on the constitutionality of the Pledge itself. The
first section of this Part will argue that because the plaintiffs had no
standing to challenge the Pledge of Allegiance, the majority overreached
by declaring that the Pledge was constitutional. The next section will
compare the Ninth Circuit’s decision with other decisions by federal
circuit courts to show that no other circuit court has made such an
overreaching ruling when called upon to decide the same question
presented to the Rio Linda court.
1. No standing to challenge the issue, no reason to rule
The majority opinion noted that the district court dismissed the
plaintiffs’ challenge to the Pledge and its 1954 amendment, which added
the words “under God,” and that the plaintiffs did not cross-appeal the
district court’s dismissal of those claims.107 Moreover, the majority
added that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the Pledge,108 reasoning that because the Pledge itself
does not mandate that school children or anyone else say it, the plaintiffs
failed to show that that the Pledge “causes them to suffer any concrete
and particularized injury.”109 Despite this, the majority nevertheless
analyzed and ruled on the Pledge’s constitutionality because, as the court
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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Id. at 1042.
Id.
Id. at 1016.
Id.
Id.
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noted, California’s statute encourages a recitation of the Pledge. Though
the dissent noted this logical error,110 the dissent likewise would have
unnecessarily reached the constitutionality of the 1954 amendment to the
Pledge on a questionable “as-applied” basis.111
2. No other circuit court has employed such a broad analysis
None of the other federal circuit courts, when answering virtually the
same question presented to the Rio Linda court, have ruled on the
constitutionality of the 1954 amendment to the Pledge. These courts have
restricted their analyses and holdings to the state statutes that mandate
the Pledge’s recitation.
For example, the Seventh Circuit, the first circuit presented with an
Establishment Clause challenge to a state Pledge statute, confined its
analysis to the Illinois statute that required elementary school students to
recite the Pledge.112 Its analysis included a review of the Illinois
legislative history surrounding the state statute, rather than a review of
the federal Pledge’s legislative history.113 The Seventh Circuit concluded
that the students’ recitation of the Pledge was a mere “ceremonial
invocation[] of God,” and therefore the statute did not raise
Establishment Clause concerns.114 The Seventh Circuit also observed
the Founders’ use of ceremonial invocations of God, noting that
“Madison, the author of the first amendment, issued presidential
proclamations of religious fasting and thanksgiving,” 115 and that “[t]he
tradition of thanksgiving proclamations began with President
Washington, who presided over the constitutional convention.”116 All of
the court’s analysis refrained from addressing the constitutionality of the
1954 amendment to the Pledge.

110. Id. at 1081 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“Has the majority admitted to rendering an
unconstitutional advisory opinion?”).
111. Id. (emphasis omitted).
112. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 122 ¶ 27-3 (current version at 122 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-3 (West 2011)) (“The
Pledge of Allegiance shall be recited each school day by pupils in elementary educational
institutions supported or maintained in whole or in part by public funds.”).
113. Id. at 443.
114. Id. at 445. As a result of this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit did not apply any of the
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause tests.
115. Id. at 445–46 (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 100 (1986)).
116. Id. at 446.
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Likewise, the Fourth Circuit confined its review to the Virginia
Pledge statute in an Establishment Clause challenge to its validity.117 It
held that the state statute did not violate the Establishment Clause.118
Much like the Rio Linda court, the Fourth Circuit avoided much of the
coercion analysis by reasoning that the Pledge recitation is a patriotic
exercise, noting that “nothing in any of the school prayer cases suggests
the same analysis applies when the challenged activity is not a religious
exercise.”119 Finding strong support in national historical references to
deity, the Fourth Circuit held that the Virginia Pledge statute was
constitutional.120 Like the Seventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit limited its
analysis to the state statute, avoiding a broad exploration of the
legislative history of the 1954 amendment to the Pledge of Allegiance.
Recently, the First Circuit upheld the constitutionality of New
Hampshire’s Pledge statute.121 The district court rejected the plaintiffs’
argument that the federal Pledge statute was being applied to them
because “the statute merely prescribes the text of the Pledge and does not
command any person to recite it or lead others in its recitation.”122 The
First Circuit confined its holding to the state Pledge statute because the
constitutionality of the federal Pledge itself was not at issue on appeal.123
The court rejected the traditional ceremonial deism reasoning,
acknowledging that the words “under God” have religious value, noting,
“[t]hat the phrase has some religious content is demonstrated by the fact
that those who are religious, as well as those who are not, could
reasonably be offended by the claim that it does not.”124
Most notably, the former Ninth Circuit opinion in Newdow, now
overturned by the Supreme Court in Elk Grove, did not go so far as to
declare the Pledge’s 1954 amendment unconstitutional.125 Without
engaging in an analysis of the 1954 Pledge amendment, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that “[t]he school district’s policy here, like the school’s
action in Lee, places students in the untenable position of choosing
between participating in an exercise with religious content or
117. Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2005).
118. Id. at 408.
119. Id. at 407.
120. Id. at 408.
121. Freedom From Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
122. Id. at 5 n.8.
123. Id. at 6.
124. Id. at 7.
125. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 488 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
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protesting.”126 Therefore, despite holding that the school board’s Pledge
policy was unconstitutional, the prior Ninth Circuit opinion did not go so
far as to rule on the constitutionality of the 1954 amendment to the
Pledge.
B. The Ninth Circuit Inappropriately Used Ceremonial Deism Reasoning
Though the Rio Linda opinion never uses the phrase “ceremonial
deism,” its reasoning is very much grounded in the doctrine. Before
discussing specific examples from the opinion, this Note will explain
what the ceremonial deism doctrine is and how it has come to be used by
courts.
1. A brief history of ceremonial deism
The doctrine of ceremonial deism was first articulated in Supreme
Court jurisprudence by Justice Brennan, who described it in his dissent to
Lynch v. Donnelly.127 He explained that ceremonial references to deity,
like the one found in the Pledge and in the national motto, are “protected
from Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost
through rote repetition any significant religious content.”128 Such
references, according to Justice Brennan, have perfectly secular
purposes, including “solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring
commitment to meet some national challenge in a manner that simply
could not be fully served in our culture if government were limited to
purely nonreligious phrases.”129 Justice Brennan reasoned that such
references have “essentially secular meaning” because they serve secular
purposes and because they have a part in the nation’s history.130
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Elk Grove builds upon the
reasoning of Justice Brennan.131 Speaking of the words “under God”
added by Congress’s 1954 amendment, O’Connor argued that “[a]ny
religious freight the words may have been meant to carry originally has

126. Id.
127. 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see generally William Trunk, The
Scourge of Contextualism: Ceremonial Deism and the Establishment Clause, 49 B.C. L. REV. 571,
578–83 (2008) (giving a history of the ceremonial deism arguments in Supreme Court precedent and
arguing that the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s precedents).
128. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 818 (1983)).
129. Id. at 717.
130. Id.
131. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 33 (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment).
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long since been lost.”132 Justice O’Connor also attempted to articulate an
analytical framework for addressing ceremonial deism claims. She
explained a four-factor test in which the court determines whether a
practice can survive Establishment Clause review because of ceremonial
deism based on (1) the history and ubiquity of the practice, (2) the
“absence of worship or prayer,” (3) the absence of reference to particular
religion, and (4) whether the disputed practice has minimal religious
content.133 Concluding that the Pledge constitutes an instance of
ceremonial deism, Justice O’Connor would have reached the merits in
Elk Grove and held that the Pledge statute did not violate the
Establishment Clause.134
Justice O’Connor also joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring
opinion, wherein he asserted that the Pledge is constitutional chiefly
because its tradition, history, and purpose—words that are characteristic
in ceremonial deism arguments—save it from Establishment Clause
review.135 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the majority erred in
not finding standing.136 Chief Justice Rehnquist cited numerous
occasions in history where public officials have invoked the name of
deity in the public arena.137 “The phrase ‘under God’ in the Pledge
seems, as a historical matter, to sum up the attitude of the Nation’s
leaders, and to manifest itself in many of our public observances.”138
Therefore, the Pledge, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, is not an
affirmation of personal belief in God but rather in the Founders’ belief in
God.
2. Rio Linda’s ceremonial deism arguments
The majority in Rio Linda employs reasoning similar to that in the
Elk Grove concurrences to argue that the Pledge is devoid of any serious

132. Id. at 41.
133. Id. at 37–45.
134. Id. at 33.
135. Id. at 18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment).
136. Id. at 24.
137. Id. at 26–30 (noting George Washington’s 1789 inauguration wherein he opened the
Bible that he would swear upon to Psalms 121:1 and added “So help me God” after his oath;
Washington’s issuance of a proclamation designating a day of thanksgiving and prayer; Lincoln’s
Gettysburg and second inaugural addresses, each mentioning God; Woodrow Wilson’s appeal to
Congress to declare war against Germany, mentioning God; a mention of God by Presidents
Roosevelt and Eisenhower; “In God We Trust” on currency; and the court marshal of the Supreme
Court’s declaration, “God save the United States and this honorable court”).
138. Id. at 26.
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religious meaning. Much like Chief Justice Rehnquist’s observation in
Elk Grove, the Rio Linda court reasoned that the words “under God”
were not religious, but were merely “a reference to the historical and
political underpinnings of our nation.”139 Additionally, according to the
majority, the words “under God” can be read as “a powerful admission
by the government of its own limitations.”140 Quoting Justice Brennan,
the Rio Linda majority reasoned that the words of the Pledge “may
merely recognize the historical fact that our Nation was believed to have
been founded ‘under God.’”141
For the reasons that will follow, this reasoning is inappropriate.
3. A criticism of ceremonial deism
The principal problem with ceremonial deism is that it offends the
very persons that it purports to support—the religious.142 It seems to
offend, for example, Christian scripture that counsels directly against
vain repetitions of religious sayings.143 Perhaps this is why the doctrine
has not garnered the complete support of religious individuals. In the
Seventh Circuit’s opinion upholding the constitutionality of a state
pledge statute, the majority’s reliance upon ceremonial deism elicited an
indignant concurrence, which complained that it was not necessary to
“totally denude the Pledge by reducing its language to the lowest
common denominator of ‘ceremonial deism’” in order to uphold the
139. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1036 (9th Cir. 2010).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1036–37 (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 304 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
142. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Unprincipled Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 497, 504 (1996) (calling such characterizations “offensive fictions”). Professor Smith asserts
that
it is offensive to all concerned—and, more important, obfuscating and unhelpful—to engage
in far-fetched, systematic denials of the nation’s (admittedly very ambiguous) religious
character, as in the now official view that practices such as legislative prayer or the national
motto “In God We Trust” do not have religious content and significance. Our commitment
to principled constitutional doctrine, coupled with the particular principles currently in
vogue, has forced us into a situation where these sorts of disingenuous claims seem almost
mandatory.
Id.; see, e.g., Peter Steinfels, Beliefs; Some Believers, Believe It or Not, Are Cringing at the Defense
of ‘One Nation Under God.’, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2004, at B6 (“And why aren’t more believers
distressed when language that pretty clearly affirms an existing, active, transcendental God must be
defended as nothing more than language about what the nation’s framers thought two centuries
ago?”).
143. Matthew 6:7 (King James) (“But when ye pray, use not vain repetitions, as the heathen
do: for they think that they shall be heard for their much speaking.”).
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constitutionality of the Pledge.144 Moreover, the concurrence reasoned,
such a reference does not “become permissible under the First
Amendment only when it has been repeated so often that it is sapped of
religious significance.”145
Ceremonial deism is also met with incredulity by strict separatists
who stringently oppose any government reference to deity. For example,
Erwin Chemerinsky, who adamantly advocates for a strictly secular
government,146 notes a significant discrepancy between the ceremonial
deism arguments often asserted by religious persons and the actual
motivations of those religious persons. He observes that when he argued
against Texas’s Ten Commandments monument in Van Orden v.
Perry,147 he received “a large amount of what can only be described as
hate mail” from those who wished to keep the religious symbols on the
government’s property.148 “Some of it, in its viciousness, was
shocking.”149 He contrasted the religious motivations in the hate mail
with what the State of Texas argued before the Supreme Court regarding
its motivations for keeping the monument: “[T]hat it wanted the Ten
Commandments monument to remain because of the historical
importance of the Ten Commandments as a source of law.”150
Likewise, in Justice Blackmun’s dissent to Lynch v. Donnelly, he
criticized the majority’s decision because it encouraged the use of a
religious display in “a setting where Christians feel constrained in
acknowledging its symbolic meaning . . . .”151 Powerfully, he concluded,
“Surely, this is a misuse of a sacred symbol.”152
Lastly, the ceremonial deism justification for religious references to
deity is problematic because it does not make logical sense. One scholar
argues that if the words “under God” have no meaning at all, then there

144. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437, 448 (7th Cir. 1992) (Manion, J.,
concurring) (noting that words used in public ceremonies must retain their meaning because if the
phrase “under God” has lost all of its meaning, so have the rest of the words in the pledge); see also
Trunk, supra note 127, at 599 (“[W]hy has only the religious part lost meaning?”).
145. Sherman, 980 F.2d at 448.
146. Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Church and State Should Be Separate, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2193, 2195 (2008) (averring that he agreed to argue Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005),
a Ten Commandments case, because he believes that the government should be secular).
147. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
148. Chemerinsky, supra note 146, at 2193.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2194.
151. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 727 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
152. Id.

930

DO NOT DELETE

911

1/31/2013 3:51 PM

Preventing Divisiveness

is no reason to leave them in the Pledge.153 Furthermore, according to
the same scholar, Justice O’Connor’s admission that the words are
unnecessary supports this assertion.154 And if, as the Rio Linda majority
asserts, “the Pledge is one of allegiance to our Republic, not of allegiance
to the God or to any religion,”155 certainly the removal of the words
“under God” would not hinder the Pledge’s patriotic efficacy. Thus,
efforts to devalue religious references do not support their inclusion in
the Pledge or in other government declarations.
For each of these reasons, ceremonial deism justifications supporting
the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance should be rejected. By
doing so, religious individuals can be honest about their motivations for
allowing government officials to refer to deity or for allowing a
government to maintain religious objects on its property. 156 Furthermore,
religious persons can avoid offending their own moral principles by not
relegating their sacred symbols to the realm of the meaningless in order
to argue in favor of their constitutionality.
D. Courts Should Use the Divisiveness Test to Evaluate the
Constitutionality of Existing Government References to Deity
Having argued that ceremonial deism is not a proper justification for
the Pledge’s constitutionality, this Note proposes, as an alternative to the
Supreme Court’s current Establishment Clause tests, a standard that
would allow an acknowledgement of a religious element in existing
government references to deity. This proposed standard would guide
courts’ decisions in reviewing the constitutionality of longstanding
government references to deity, such as the Pledge and existing
government monuments. The standard was advocated by Justice Breyer
in his concurrence to Van Orden v. Perry, wherein he advocated for the
exercise of “legal judgment” in determining whether the government
action causes religious divisiveness.157 Though this divisiveness
rationale is not new,158 its application has not yet been used in cases
153. Trunk, supra note 127, at 599.
154. Id.
155. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2010).
156. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 146 (contrasting religious individuals’ motivations
with the State of Texas’s posited motivations for maintaining the Ten Commandments monument on
the Texas State Capitol grounds).
157. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
158. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J.
1667 (2006) (summarizing the history of the religious divisiveness reasoning in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence).
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analyzing the constitutionality of state Pledge statutes and other
governmental references to deity. This Note will explain the divisiveness
rationale and will argue for its application in cases involving state Pledge
statutes and existing monuments that have religious elements and have
existed for at least forty years.
1. Justice Breyer’s divisiveness analysis in Van Orden v. Perry
In 2005, the Supreme Court issued two seemingly contradictory
decisions on the same day. The first case upheld the constitutionality of a
monument containing the Ten Commandments that sat on the grounds of
the Texas State Capitol,159 but the second held unconstitutional two Ten
Commandments monuments that were located in state courthouses.160
Though Justice Breyer joined the majority opinion in McCreary County,
holding that the Ten Commandments displays were unconstitutional,161
he concurred in the judgment in Van Orden, upholding the
constitutionality of the Ten Commandments monument on the grounds
of the Texas state capitol.162 His analysis of the potential divisiveness
was the deciding factor in his Van Orden concurrence, and his reasoning
provides valuable guidance for interpreting future cases involving
existing government references to deity, such as in the Pledge and in
monuments.
In Van Orden, the Court considered whether the Ten
Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas state capitol was
permissible under the Establishment Clause.163 The grounds of the
capitol are decorated with twenty-one historical markers and seventeen
monuments, including a six-foot tall monument inscribed with the Ten
Commandments.164 For six years, the plaintiff, Van Orden, often visited
the grounds.165 He commenced an Establishment Clause action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to obtain an injunction requiring the removal of the
monument.166 The Supreme Court’s plurality opinion affirmed the trial

159. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681.
160. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850, 858 (2005).
161. Id.
162. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
163. Id. at 681 (majority opinion).
164. Id. A map of the grounds is included in Justice Breyer’s concurrence. Id. at 706 app. B
(Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
165. Id. at 681 (majority opinion).
166. Id. at 682.
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court and appeals court, holding that there was no Establishment Clause
violation.167
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment.168 His opinion notes that
because there is no mechanical, easy dividing line between
establishments and nonestablishments of religion, judges must look to
the “basic purposes” of the Religion Clauses.169 According to Justice
Breyer, one of these basic purposes is to avoid divisiveness based upon
religion.170 To serve this purpose, Justice Breyer notes, “The government
must avoid excessive interference with, or promotion of, religion.”171
However, Breyer rejects an Establishment Clause “absolutism” that
would “compel the government to purge from the public sphere all that
in any way partakes of the religious.”172 To do so, according to Breyer,
is inconsistent with American tradition, and “would also tend to promote
the kind of social conflict the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”173
As this Note will also advocate, Breyer asserts that there is “no testrelated substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”174 In exercising
this legal judgment, a judge uses the Court’s current Establishment
Clause tests only as guideposts, “remain[ing] faithful to the underlying
purposes of the [Religion] Clauses,” and “tak[ing] account of context and
consequences measured in light of those purposes.”175
Applying this legal judgment standard, Justice Breyer concluded that
the context of the Ten Commandments monument suggests that its
predominant purpose was to convey a secular, moral message, although
167. Id. at 683.
168. Id. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
169. Id.
170. Id.; see also Philip C. Aka, Assessing the Constitutionality of President George W.
Bush’s Faith-Based Initiatives, 9 J.L. SOC’Y 53, 66 (2008) (noting that “political divisiveness and
fragmentation along religious lines” was one of the main problems that the Establishment Clause
was intended to prevent (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668, 695 (1970); McCreary
Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859–60 (2005))).
171. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Cnty. of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593–94 (1989); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 723–
25 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
172. Id. (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
173. Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 672–78 (1984)); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 866 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“And what of law’s concern to diminish and peacefully
settle conflict among the Nation’s people?”).
174. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added)
(citing Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring)).
175. Id.
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the monument’s contents include a religious message.176 Not relying
upon a “literal application of any particular test,” Justice Breyer
concluded that the Texas monument did not infringe upon the
Establishment Clause.177 To rule otherwise would, according to Justice
Breyer, “lead the law to exhibit a hostility toward religion that has no
place in our Establishment Clause traditions.”178 Additionally, finding a
violation might “create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness
that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid” because it would
encourage challenges to existing Ten Commandments monuments in
public buildings nationwide.179
According to Justice Breyer, the monument was not that divisive
because it had stood unchallenged for nearly forty years.180 He suggests
that a newly constructed monument would likely run afoul of his “legal
judgment” because it would be more divisive. “[A] more contemporary
state effort to focus attention upon a religious text is certainly likely to
prove divisive in a way that this longstanding, pre-existing monument
has not.”181
2. Justice Breyer’s legal judgment standard and similar arguments
Justice Breyer is not alone in his rejection of the Court’s
Establishment Clause tests in favor of the exercise of legal judgment.182
For example, Steven D. Smith has argued that “there is not and cannot be
any satisfactory theory or principle of religious freedom.” 183 Professor
Smith argues in favor of a prudential approach to Establishment Cause
review, as opposed to what he characterizes as the Supreme Court’s
principle-driven jurisprudence.184 Likewise, Justice Breyer uses identical
176. Id. at 702.
177. Id. at 703–04.
178. Id. at 704.
179. Id. (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717–29 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
180. Id. at 704.
181. Id. at 703.
182. Id. at 700 (arguing for the exercise of “legal judgment” rather than the Court’s
Establishment Clause tests when deciding “difficult borderline cases”).
183. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, at v (1991) (“Virtually no one is happy with the Supreme
Court’s doctrines and decisions in this area or with its explanations of those doctrines and
decisions.”); see also Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly Religious Orthodoxy: A Response to Steven
D. Smith, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 729, 729 (2003) (quoting and agreeing with Smith that nearly
everyone is dissatisfied with the Supreme Court’s Religion Clause doctrines).
184. Smith, supra note 142, at 499.
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language to characterize his own jurisprudence: “I belong to a tradition
of judges who approach the law with prudence and pragmatism.”185
These ideas are born out of a dissatisfaction with the Court’s current
tests. Professor Smith asserts that the Supreme Court’s attempts in the
past fifty years to develop and follow a principled approach have been
mistaken.186 Such attempts, according to Smith, are futile:
If after half-a-century of fairly intensive research and thinking no
consensus about the proper principle of religious freedom has emerged,
but instead every principle proposed by scholars or judges has met with
serious objections from other scholars and judges, we might begin to
suspect that the quest for a satisfactory constitutional principle of
religious freedom is misguided.187

For this reason, Smith advocates an unprincipled approach to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, one that he characterizes as being
on a “largely ad hoc basis.”188
Smith’s advocacy for an unprincipled approach to the Establishment
Clause seems to mirror Breyer’s approach, in that Smith seeks to avoid
divisiveness caused by overzealous adherence to principle. According to
Smith, converting religious liberty interests into issues of principle has
not furthered the goal of promoting civil peace and avoiding alienation,
since “if you believe there is a ‘true’ constitutional principle of religious
freedom, then you may also believe that we must enforce that principle
regardless of the turmoil and alienation that this course may entail.”189
These same considerations motivated Justice Breyer’s divisiveness
reasoning in Van Orden, wherein Justice Breyer avoided the rigid

185. Jeffrey Toobin, Without a Paddle: Can Stephen Breyer Save the Obama Agenda in the
Supreme Court? NEW YORKER, Sept. 27, 2010, at 38 (emphasis added) (quoting Justice Breyer in a
personal interview) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Breyer’s continued characterization
of his legal philosophy provides additional insight into his Van Orden opinion: “That tradition [of
prudence and pragmatism] is not subjective, and that tradition is not politics. It is a tradition that tries
to understand the values and purposes underlying the Constitution and the laws. It’s a tradition that
says there’s a need to maintain stability in the law, without freezing the law . . . .” Id. (quoting
Justice Breyer in a personal interview) (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Smith, supra note 142, at 497.
187. Id. at 499.
188. Steven D. Smith, Our Agnostic Constitution, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120, 166 n.172 (2008)
(citing Smith, supra note 142).
189. Smith, supra note 142, at 501; see also Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged
by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care? 60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 156–57 (2007) (speculating that the
Supreme Court’s refusal to reach the merits in Elk Grove was out of a fear that its ruling would
provoke public outrage).
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application of the Court’s Establishment Clause tests because to do so
would have exhibited hostility to religion.190
3. Justice Breyer’s legal judgment of divisiveness applied to the facts of
Rio Linda
Justice Breyer’s arguments for the exercise of legal judgment
provides a valuable framework for future cases involving Establishment
Clause challenges to governmental references to deity. Justice Breyer’s
preference for exercising legal judgment combined with his attention to
divisiveness, when properly applied to the Rio Linda case, provides an
example of how Justice Breyer’s approach may help judges in
subsequent cases to reach the right result. Such an approach does not
require parties to resort to ceremonial deism rationales or other
questionable justifications for advocating the constitutionality of
government references to deity in the Pledge and in existing monuments.
For example, in the facts of Rio Linda, a judge exercising Justice
Breyer’s legal judgment standard would take into account the basic
purposes of the First Amendment, including avoiding divisiveness along
religious lines.191 Using the existing Establishment Clause tests as
guideposts, a judge would examine the context and the consequences of
the Pledge recitation to see if the government was causing divisiveness
based upon religion.192 Like the monument in Van Orden, the Pledge
predominantly conveys a secular message but includes a religious
element, suggesting that it would pass Justice Breyer’s legal judgment
standard. Furthermore, the Pledge’s religious content has survived
Establishment Clause review for more than forty years, longer than the
Ten Commandments monument had sat upon the grounds of the Texas
capitol in Van Orden. The Pledge’s age suggests that its inclusion in
schools has not been extremely divisive along religious lines.
To find a violation under the facts of Rio Linda would certainly
“create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the
Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”193 The Pledge, as it is currently
written, is highly valued by many people.194 To many religious
190. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); see
also supra text accompanying notes 168–81.
191. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
192. Id. at 700.
193. Id. at 704 (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717–29 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
194. See, e.g., Evelyn Nieves, Judges Ban Pledge of Allegiance from Schools, Citing ‘Under
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adherents, the acknowledgement in the Pledge that their nation is “under
God” is of profound importance.195 A judge exercising the legal
judgment espoused by Justice Breyer would take into account the
divisiveness among religious lines that would be created by a ruling that
the Pledge is unconstitutional. Therefore, a court employing Justice
Breyer’s legal judgment methodology would likely come to the same
result reached by each federal circuit court referenced above, but would
do so without relying upon reasoning that denies the deeply religious
meaning of the words “under God.”
4. The legal judgment of the divisiveness standard: prudent and
pragmatic
The approach advocated by this Note provides a pragmatic approach
to difficult cases: government references to deity, in declarations and
monuments that have been in place for more than forty years,196 are
analyzed under Breyer’s legal judgment standard for divisiveness.
Government cannot construct new monuments containing religious
elements or standardize new references to deity.197 Therefore, old
monuments and governmental references to deity would likely be
permitted so as to further the First Amendment’s purpose of preventing
divisiveness along religious lines. For example, the Supreme Court
marshal’s proclamation, “God save the United States and this Honorable
Court,”198 would likely survive under this test. But new references would
God,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 27, 2002, at A1 (reporting on the aftermath of the Ninth Circuit’s 2002
ruling that the Pledge violated the Establishment Clause, including the “protest across the political
spectrum” and the “immediate reaction in Washington, where senators unanimously passed a
resolution condemning the ruling”); Jimmie E. Gates, Judge Admits He Violated Rights, THE
CLARION LEDGER, Dec. 2, 2010, at B1 (reporting on an attorney who was held in contempt and
jailed because of his refusal to say the Pledge of Allegiance in court).
195. See, e.g., Nieves, supra note 194 (noting the harsh, swift response to the Ninth Circuit’s
decision holding that the Pledge was unconstitutional, including the most “vehement reactions” from
conservative religious groups).
196. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682. Justice Breyer found it persuasive that the Ten
Commandments monument in this case had survived unchallenged for forty years. This Note adopts
this age as a bright-line compromise. Id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). Such linedrawing is not unheard of in the Court’s precedents. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(expressing an expectation that the racial preferences condoned by the Court’s opinion would be
unnecessary in twenty-five years); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1817 (2010) (noting that
“[t]ime also has played its role” in its constitutional analysis of a cross constructed on federal land).
197. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (“[A] more
contemporary state effort to focus attention upon a religious text is certainly likely to prove divisive
in a way that this longstanding, pre-existing monument has not.”).
198. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 632 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring
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fail this test, since this would also serve the First Amendment’s purpose
of preventing religious divisiveness. Thus, religious individuals would
not lose deeply important, longstanding monuments and other references
to deity, but strict separatists could be confident that no new deific
references would pass this test.
Such a pragmatic approach would not be new or radical. Suzanna
Sherry, for example, argues that the Rehnquist Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence was “quintessentially pragmati[c].”199 She writes, “Not
every constitutional case requires recourse to first principles, and indeed,
most require more subtlety than such recourse can produce. The
Rehnquist Court’s free-speech cases provide an example of the benefits
of a more nuanced and pragmatist approach in the context of a mature
jurisprudence.”200
Moreover, an ad-hoc approach to cases involving old government
monuments and references to deity would not be entirely new to the
Supreme Court. Professor Kyle Duncan suggests that, despite the Court’s
seemingly objective Establishment Clause tests, the results have been
subjective, although the cases are worded in the tests’ terms. “Applying
even sophisticated rules to such situations has not led the Court
consistently toward nonsubjective solutions, but rather has invited
various justices simply to reformulate church-state problems in the rule’s
terms.”201 Duncan asserts that the Supreme Court has created “spiraling
confusion in its jurisprudence” by attempting to “erect complex rules that
ostensibly balance the various competing interests and policies in these
conflicts.”202 Likewise, Professor Brett Scharffs has noted with
agreement criticisms that the Court’s religious liberty jurisprudence is
“confusing and chaotic.”203 This confusion is evident in the above
in judgment).
199. Suzanna Sherry, Hard Cases Make Good Judges, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 3, 4. But see Eugene
Volokh, Pragmatism vs. Ideology in Free Speech Cases, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 33, 36 (responding to
Sherry and arguing that “under any but the broadest (and least useful) definitions of pragmatism, the
majority of these cases are indeed decisions about matters of ‘principle’”).
200. Sherry, supra note 199, at 30–31.
201. Kyle Duncan, Subsidiarity and Religious Establishments in the United States
Constitution, 52 VILL. L. REV. 67, 128 (2007).
202. Id. at 128–29.
203. Brett G. Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1217, 1224
(citing MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 247 (1988); Stuart Buck, The Nineteenth-Century Understanding of the Establishment Clause,
6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 399, 400 (2002); Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality, Separation and
Accommodation: Tensions in American First Amendment Doctrine, in LAW AND RELIGION 63, 64
(Rex J. Adhar ed., 2000)).
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decisions of the four circuit courts that have heard constitutional
challenges to state Pledge statutes, since each employed widely different
reasoning and applied the tests differently.204
Given the Court’s “confused and chaotic”205 precedent in this area,
adopting a legal judgment standard would give greater freedom to judges
to apply the non-divisiveness principle of the First Amendment without
being constrained by the tests articulated by the Supreme Court. This
Note does not advocate the abandonment of the Court’s Establishment
Clause tests in all instances, but rather advocates allowing judges to
exercise their legal judgment in a narrow area of cases—those cases that
involve government monuments that include references to deity, forty
years and older, and existing government declarations or practices that
include references to deity, such as the Pledge of Allegiance. Such a
small deviation would help alleviate religious divisiveness but would not
be so drastic as to completely abandon fidelity to the Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
5. Criticisms of the legal judgment standard
This legal judgment standard of divisiveness has not been without its
critics.206 However, most criticisms of the legal judgment standard are
directed at its use in all Establishment Clause cases. This Note argues for
its application only in narrow circumstances where the court reviews the
constitutionality of longstanding government references to deity.
Moreover, despite these criticisms, the Court has used divisiveness
reasoning in past decisions,207 and it continues to do so.208 If Justice

204. Freedom From Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010);
Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the Lemon,
endorsement, and coercion tests in upholding the constitutionality of the state Pledge statute); Myers
v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d 395, 407 (4th Cir. 2005) (resting much of its decision on
dicta by the United Supreme Court suggesting that the Pledge is constitutional and declining to apply
specific tests because the pledge is a “patriotic exercise”); Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21,
980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying none of the Establishment Clause tests because the
Pledge is a “ceremonial invocation[] of God”).
205. Scharffs, supra note 203, at 1224.
206. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden v. Perry, 14
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2005); Garnett, supra note 158; Edward McGlynn Gaffney Jr.,
Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and
Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 205 (1980) (criticizing the divisiveness rationale in general).
207. Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, Contract, and the First
Amendment, 51 MD. L. REV. 312, 389 n.336 (1992). See also Garnett, supra note 158, for a history
of the divisiveness rationale in the Supreme Court’s precedent.
208. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1817 (2010) (plurality opinion) (quoting the

939

DO NOT DELETE

1/31/2013 3:51 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2011

Kennedy’s recent plurality opinion, which favorably quotes the
divisiveness language from Van Orden,209 is any indication, it is likely
that the reasoning will continue to find a place in the Court’s future
Establishment Clause decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the legal standard applied, the Ninth Circuit did not
need to rule on the constitutionality of the 1954 amendment to the
Pledge. Had the Rio Linda court been able to apply this Note’s proposed
test, the court likely would have come to the same conclusion, but could
have done so without resorting to ceremonial deism arguments.
The divisiveness standard advocated by this Note seeks to develop a
solution to the strong and sometimes emotional disagreements about the
acceptability of governmental references to deity. For many individuals,
judicial removal of such references is hurtful on both a religious and
political level. Contrariwise, strict separatists have valid and compelling
arguments against such references. This Note’s proposed standard
constitutes a compromise between both of these interests: no new
government references to deity, but no judicial removal of longstanding
references to deity in government monuments and no judicial
prohibitions on longstanding government references to deity. Unlike the
Supreme Court’s current Establishment Clause jurisprudence, this
compromise adequately considers the divisiveness that is created when
courts hold that nearly every government reference to deity is
unconstitutional.
Devin Snow



divisiveness language from Van Orden and noting the disrespect to fallen soldiers that would be
caused by removing a cross located on federal land). Compare Chemerinsky, supra note 206, at 14–
15 (“The passage of time cannot justify a government action that violates the Constitution; there is
no statute of limitations for Establishment Clause claims.”), with Salazar, 130 S.Ct. at 1817
(plurality opinion) (“Time also has played its role.”).
209. Salazar, 130 S.Ct. at 1817.
. J.D. Candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
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